Recent advances in quantum physics have led to a renewal of interest in the problem of human freedom and in the wider problem of indeterminism. It is important to recognize, however, that if every denial of determinism is to be called indeterminism, the latter term covers a wide range of logically distinguishable positions. We should perhaps speak in the plural number of indeterminisms rather than of indeterminism. For determinism may be defined, simply, as the doctrine that every event has a (...) cause; or we may add that the effect is always uniquely determined; or that when the effect is complex it can always be exhaustively analyzed into components each of which is the effect of a component of the cause; or that every cause directly or indirectly includes the entire universe. And in the case of each of these, or of still other interpretations of determinism, the denial would be a form of indeterminism. (shrink)

According to the Laplacian definition, the probability of an event is the ratio of “favorable” cases to possible cases. It is obvious that the definition presupposes the equal probability of the possible cases; and to make the definition of probability depend upon the conception of equal probability has the appearance, at least, of a vicious circle. Moreover it is hard to see how we can assure ourselves that each possible case is really no more and no less probable than any (...) other. But even if we define probability as the relative frequency of occurrence of events under a given set of conditions, or of true conclusions from premises of a given type, we still require the conception of equal probability, unless indeed we choose to renounce entirely the mathematical expression and calculation of probabilities. (shrink)

In a recent number of Philosophy of Science, Mr. C. D. Hardie offers some interesting suggestions concerning the problem of other minds. In his view the fact that we feel certain of their existence constitutes a problem; and he wishes to find a rational justification for this certainty. “What grounds have I for believing in the existence of other minds?” he asks. He is attracted by the traditional argument from analogy, but finds it incomplete; for “any conclusion arrived at by (...) analogy and induction is at best only probable,” and “I am certain that other minds exist.” Again we find him remarking that “there is room for an account which makes our knowledge of them depend in some way on analogy... but which is such that we can be certain that other minds exist....”. (shrink)

In his presidential address on “Symbols, Signs, and Signals,” given before the Association for Symbolic Logic, December 28, 1938, Professor C. J. Ducasse made and important distinction between what he there called the indicative and the quiddative symbol. He remarked in passing that he thought it possible to show that: 1) “The same entity may function both as indicative and as quiddative symbol: or one part of a complex symbol may be quiddative and another indicative”; and 2) “the difference between (...) the two roles is irreducible: the indicative is not a species of the quiddative nor vice versa.” An indicative symbol is defined as “one of which the distinctive property is to orient our attention to some place in an order system …”; and a quiddative symbol as “one of which the distinctive property is to make us conceive a certain kind of thing—a certain ‘what'—no matter where in any order system it may or may not be existing.”. (shrink)